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Biased Judgments of Fairness in Bargaining 
By LINDA BABCOCK, GEORGE LOEWENSTEIN, SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, 
AND COLIN CAMERER * 
When court trials (or arbitration) are the 
mechanisms for resolving bargaining im- 
passes, the costs and risks associated with 
third-party intervention should motivate 
settlement (Henry Farber and Harry Katz, 
1979). However, empirical evidence suggests 
that impasses and inefficient settlements are 
common in the legal system and in contract 
negotiations. For example, one study of asbes- 
tos suits found that only 37 cents of every dol- 
lar spent by both sides end up in the plaintiffs' 
hands (James Kakalik et al., 1983). 
One important model of bargaining devel- 
oped in the law and economics literature views 
impasse as a consequence of disputants' un- 
certainty about the judge, jury, or fact finder.' 
George Priest and Benjamin Klein (1984) ar- 
gue that potential litigants are unable to esti- 
mate precisely the decision of a judge or jury 
if a case goes to trial. If both sides construct 
unbiased point estimates of the value of going 
to trial, as Priest and Klein assume, then half 
of the time plaintiffs will anticipate a higher 
judgment than defendants. A case will fail to 
be settled before trial when the plaintiff 's es- 
timate of the judge's verdict exceeds the 
defendant's by enough to offset the incentive 
for settlement that is produced by risk aversion 
and trial costs. 
In this paper we propose an explanation for 
impasse that also rests on disputants' misesti- 
mation of judicial decisions but that differs 
from Priest and Klein's in one crucial respect. 
Drawing upon psychological research doc- 
umenting systematic biases in individual 
judgments of fairness, we conjecture that pre- 
dictions of judicial decisions will be syste- 
matically biased in a self-serving manner. 
Even when parties have the same information, 
they will come to different conclusions about 
what a fair settlement would be and base their 
predictions of judicial behavior on their own 
views of what is fair. As a result, we argue, 
expectations of an adjudicated settlement are 
likely to be biased in a manner that increases 
the likelihood of an impasse. Whereas Priest 
and Klein would argue that the parties are 
drawing randomly from the same distribution 
of judicial preferences, we believe they are, in 
effect, drawing from different distributions. 
The fact that people interpret information in 
a self-serving manner means that, contrary to 
a fundamental derivation of Bayesian theory 
(Bruno de Finetti, 1964), giving two parties 
more information may cause their expectations 
to diverge. Priest and Klein's perspective im- 
plies that additional information would make 
impasses less likely, whereas ours predicts that 
additional information will often increase the 
probability of impasse. 
There is considerable evidence from the 
psychology literature of a self-serving bias in 
judgments of fairness. When married couples 
estimate the fraction of various household 
tasks they are responsible for, their estimates 
typically sum to more than 100 percent 
(Michael Ross and Fiore Sicoly, 1982). Spec- 
tators viewing a football game believe that 
their team commits fewer infractions than 
do supporters of the opposing side (Albert 
H. Hastorf and Hadley Cantril, 1954). When 
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people work different amounts of time at a 
joint task, those who work more generally be- 
lieve that they should earn more, while those 
who work less believe that both parties should 
be paid equally (David Messick and Keith 
Sentis, 1979). 
Findings consistent with a self-serving bias 
have also been observed in bargaining exper- 
iments. Subjects in studies by Alvin E. Roth 
and Keith J. Murnighan (1982) bargained 
over how to distribute 100 lottery tickets. If 
one player won the lottery, she received $20; 
if the other won, she received $5. There are 
two obvious ways to split the tickets: 50 tickets 
to each (equal chance of winning) or 20 tick- 
ets to the $20-prize player and 80 tickets to the 
$5-prize player (equal expected dollar value). 
When neither player knew who had which 
prize amount, subjects generally agreed to di- 
vide the tickets about equally, and only 12 per- 
cent of pairs failed to reach an agreement, 
ending up with no payoff. However, when 
both parties knew both prize amounts, the $20- 
prize player was likely to hold out for half of 
the tickets, while the $5-prize player de- 
manded 80 tickets to equalize expected values. 
In this condition 22 percent of the pairs failed 
to reach agreement. 
Finally, in a recent paper (Loewenstein et 
al., 1993), we ran an experiment (on which 
the current study is based) in which two sub- 
jects were assigned the role of plaintiff and 
defendant in a legal dispute. The two parties 
read the same case materials and were in- 
formed that an actual judge had also read the 
materials and decided an award for the plain- 
tiff. Subjects then recorded what they believed 
was a fair award, predicted the judge's award, 
and tried to negotiate a settlement consisting 
of a payment from defendant to plaintiff. If the 
parties failed to settle, legal costs were im- 
posed on both parties, and the decision of the 
judge determined the value of the actual 
payment. 
The results from this previous research sup- 
ported the view that self-serving assessments 
of fairness interfere with settlement. Subjects 
were extremely biased in their assessments of 
fairness and predictions of the judge's award, 
and the bargainers' ability to reach voluntary 
settlements was negatively correlated with the 
magnitude of this bias. However, we could not 
rule out the possibility that the relationship be- 
tween settlement and the bias in predicting the 
judge was not causal. Perhaps an unmeasured 
factor, such as variation in a character trait of 
the negotiators, caused the same people who 
exhibited the self-serving bias to negotiate in 
a manner that impeded settlement. 
The major goal of this paper is to test for a 
causal link between the self-serving bias and 
nonsettlement. In the experiment reported be- 
low, we manipulate the magnitude of the self- 
serving bias by informing subjects of their 
roles at different points before negotiating 
and then examine the impact on settlement 
behavior. 
I. The Experiment 
The experiment we use in this paper 
uses the same dispute as in our earlier 
paper-a claim for damages resulting 
from a motorcycle-automobile accident. 
The plaintiff (motorcyclist) is suing the de- 
fendant (automobile driver) for $100,000. 
The two parties were given precisely the 
same information and knew that the infor- 
mation they were given was identical. 
Subjects received 27 pages of testimony ab- 
stracted from an actual case in Texas.2 They 
were informed that we had given the same 
materials they saw to a judge in Texas, who 
had decided how much, if anything, to award 
to the plaintiff.3 
After reading the case materials, but be- 
fore negotiating, the subjects made two 
judgments: (i) what they thought was a fair 
settlement from the vantage point of a neu- 
tral third party; (ii) their best guess of the 
amount that the judge would award. They 
2 The testimony is available from the authors upon re- 
quest. The subjects received information concerning wit- 
nesses' testimony, police reports, maps, and testimony of 
the driver (defendant) and motorcyclist (plaintiff). 
3We wanted subjects to know that an independent 
judge had read exactly the same materials that they were 
reading and that we had not selected the case based on the 
judgment awarded, but instead had first selected the case 
and then solicited a judgment on it. If we had simply cho- 
sen the judgment from an actual trial, subjects might have 
anticipated that we would choose a case with an award 
amount Iying within a particular desired range. 
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received a bonus of $1.00 at the end of the 
session if their prediction of the judge's 
award was within $5,000 of the judge's ac- 
tual award. 
The subjects were each paid a fixed fee for 
participating in the experiment. They were in- 
structed to try to negotiate an "out of court" 
settlement in the form of a money payment 
from the defendant to the plaintiff. Before the 
negotiation, the defendant was given $ 10 from 
which to make this payment. Every $10,000 
from the case was equivalent to $1 for the sub- 
jects. For example, a $40,000 settlement 
meant the defendant gave $4 to the plaintiff 
and kept $6. 
The parties had 30 minutes in which to ne- 
gotiate an agreement. If they were unable to 
settle within this time period, the judge's de- 
cision was imposed upon the parties. The 
judge's actual judgment in the case was 
$30,560, which meant that if the parties failed 
to settle, the defendant paid the plaintiff $3.06 
and kept $6.94. 
The 30-minute negotiation period was di- 
vided into six five-minute periods. At the end 
of each period, the parties submitted bids si- 
multaneously. If the bids overlapped, they set- 
tled at the midpoint. If they did not overlap, 
they were assessed $5,000 each in lawyer's 
fees to enter the next round of negotiations. If 
they were unable to reach a settlement in the 
sixth period, the judge imposed the settlement, 
and each party was charged legal fees of 
$25,000 ($2.50). 
After the negotiation was over, both sub- 
jects recorded their perceptions of how a judge 
would rate the importance of 16 predetermined 
arguments in determining the award: eight fa- 
voring the plaintiff and eight favoring the de- 
fendant. The rating scale ranged from 0 ("no 
importance" ) to 10 ( "extreme importance" ). 
We collected importance ratings to see 
whether the subjects' roles affected their per- 
ceptions of specific facts in the case. 
Nineteen pairs of graduate students from the 
Heinz School at Carnegie Mellon University, 
60 pairs of law students from the University 
of Texas, and 15 pairs of students from the 
Wharton School at the University of Pennsyl- 
vania participated in the experiment. In each 
group, subjects were randomly assigned to one 
of the two experimental conditions and to 
one of the two roles. The major manipulation 
was the order of events in the experiments. 
In condition A, subjects were given their 
roles and then read the case materials, pre- 
dicted the judge's award, assessed fairness, 
and negotiated. In condition B, subjects read 
the materials, predicted the judge's award, 
and assessed fairness before being given 
their roles. They were then given their roles 
just before negotiating. Our expectation 
was that self-serving interpretations of fair- 
ness would be more extreme, and thus set- 
tlement rates would be lower, in condition 
A, in which subjects knew their roles when 
they read the case materials and assessed 
fairness. 
Self-serving interpretations are likely to 
occur at the point when information about 
roles is assimilated. It is easier to process 
information in a biased way than it is to 
change an unbiased estimate once it has been 
made. Thus, knowing one's role while read- 
ing the information should generate a biased 
evaluation. In condition B, there is no pos- 
sibility of self-serving bias when fairness 
measures were taken, since subjects in that 
condition did not know their roles at that 
point in the experiment. Because of the di- 
minished possibility of self-serving bias in 
condition B, we predicted a lower rate of 
disagreement. 
II. Results 
The experimental manipulation affected 
the time it took to reach a settlement and the 
likelihood of settlement. Table 1 summarizes 
the results. As predicted, those who did not 
know their roles when reading the materials, 
predicting the judge's award, or assessing 
fairness (condition B) were more likely to 
settle. Ninety-four percent of the pairs in 
condition B settled, but only 72 percent of 
those who knew their roles initially (condi- 
tion A) settled-a significant difference. 
Stated differently, there were four times as 
many disagreements when bargainers knew 
their roles initially than when they did not 
know their roles. Bargaining pairs in condi- 
tion A settled in an average of 3.75 periods, 
while pairs in condition B took an average 
of 2.51 periods, also a statistically significant 
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TABLE 1-SETTLEMENT RATES AND VALUES BY CONDITION 
Settlement Average number of Mean 
Condition rate periods to settle settlement 
A: knew roles (n = 47) 0.72 3.75 $29,970 
(0.07) (0.28) ($2,676) 
B: did not know roles (n = 47) 0.94 2.51 $36,762 
(0.03) (0.21) ($2,207) 
Test for differences between x2 = 7.53 t = 3.53 t = -1.98 
conditions: (p < 0.01) (p < 0.01) (p < 0.06) 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
TABLE 2-ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF THE SELF-SERVING BIAS BY CONDITION 
Condition DIFF FAIR DIFF JUDGE SELFSERVE 
A: knew roles (n = 47) $19,756 $18,555 25.8 
($3,366) ($3,787) (2.9) 
B: did not know roles (n = 47) -$6,275 -$6,936 7.1 
($3,613) ($4,179) (3.3) 
Test for differences between t = 5.27 t = 4.52 t = 4.24 
conditions: (p < 0.01) (p < 0.01) (p < 0.01) 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
difference.4 The mean settlement was 
slightly higher in condition B. 
Table 2 presents three measures of self- 
serving bias by condition. The first measure, 
DIFF FAIR is the difference between the 
plaintiff's and the defendant's assessment of 
a fair settlement. DIFF JUDGE is the differ- 
ence between the plaintiff's and defendant's 
assessment of the judge's award.5 Both mea- 
sures in condition A are significantly different 
from zero, indicating a self-serving bias when 
the subjects knew their roles. In condition B, 
neither measure is significantly different from 
zero.6 
The last measure of the self-serving bias, 
SELFSERVE, is equal to (Ip - IP) + (ID - 
Iv ), where Ip, for example, is the plaintiff's 
importance rating of arguments favoring the 
defendant. The first two terms measure the ex- 
tent to which plaintiffs rate arguments favor- 
ing themselves as more important than 
arguments favoring defendants. The last two 
terms measure the extent to which defendants 
rate arguments favoring themselves as more 
important than arguments favoring plaintiffs. 
Therefore, the sum of the two measures cap- 
tures the pair-specific self-serving bias in the 
importance rating of arguments. SELFSERVE 4 This actually underrepresents the difference between 
the two conditions because nonsettlers are coded as set- 
tling in period 6 (because they are censored at six periods). 
5Predictions of the judge and assessments of fairness 
were highly correlated: 0.75 for plaintiffs and 0.81 for 
defendants. Defendants displayed a small degree of pes- 
simism, anticipating that the judge would award slightly 
more than what they believed was fair; plaintiffs did not 
anticipate a difference in either direction. 
6 It would be surprising to observe a significant bias for 
DIFF JUDGE or DIFF FAIR in condition B since subjects 
did not know their roles at the time they assessed fairness 
and predicted the judge's award. 
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TABLE 3-SETTLEMENT RATES BY MAGNITUDE 
OF THIE SELF-SERVING BIAS 
Settlement Number of 
Bias rate pairs 
DIFF FAIR < -20,000 1.00 14 
-20,000 c DIFF FAIR c 20,000 0.87 52 
20,000 < DIFF FAIR 0.68 28 
DIFF JUDGE < -20,000 1.00 17 
-20,000 c DIFF JUDGE c 20,000 0.90 49 
20,000 < DIFF JUDGE 0.61 28 
SELFSERVE < 9 0.97 33 
9 c SELFSERVE c 22 0.86 28 
SELFSERVE > 22 0.67 33 
is significantly greater in condition A than in 
condition B, indicating a stronger self-serving 
bias in condition A. 
Table 3 presents the relationship between 
the measures of the self-serving bias and the 
probability of settlement. As the differences 
between the parties' assessments of either the 
fair settlement or of the judge increase, the 
probability of settling decreases. Similarly, as 
the difference between the parties' assess- 
ments of the importance of arguments favoring 
themselves increases, the probability of set- 
tling decreases. 
For those who failed to settle, the mean 
value of the self-serving bias was $24,656 as 
measured by differences in perceived fair set- 
tlement points and $31,875 in terms of predic- 
tions of the judge. However, for those who did 
settle, the magnitude of the bias was only 
$3,066 for assessments of fairness and $463 
for predictions of the judge. The differences 
between settlers and nonsettlers in the mag- 
nitudes of the biases are all significantly dif- 
ferent from zero. SELFSERVE is also 
significantly higher for nonsettlers. 
The analysis of the probability of settling is 
given in Table 4. These results parallel closely 
those presented above. When the bargainers 
reach different assessments of fairness and of 
the judge, they are less likely to achieve vol- 
untary settlements. When the variable DIFF 
JUDGE is one standard deviation above its 
mean, the predicted probability of settling de- 
creases by 26 percentage points (it changes 
from 0.89 to 0.63). When DIFF FAIR is one 
standard deviation above its mean, the pre- 
dicted probability of settling decreases by 9 
TABLE 4-PROBABILITY OF SETTLEMENT, 
PROBIT RESULTS 
(1) (2) (3) 
Constant 0.5930 0.9115 1.1288 
(3.04) (3.38) (3.90) 
Did not know roles 0.9304 0.5921 0.4967 
(2.69) (1.52) (1.27) 
DIFF FAIR -0.0141 
(-1.88) 
DIFF JUDGE -0.0288 
(-3.01) 
-Log likelihood 38.2 37.0 33.5 
p value 0.0046 0.0028 0.0000 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t statistics (N = 94). The value 
of the log likelihood when all coefficients are set to zero is -42.9. 
percentage points (it changes from 0.86 to 
0.77). Notice that the experimental manipu- 
lation variable (DID NOT KNOW ROLES) 
becomes insignificant after DIFF FAIR or 
DIFF JUDGE is added to the equation. This is 
consistent with our view that the experimental 
manipulation influences fairness perceptions, 
which in turn influence the likelihood of 
settlement. 
The findings from this experiment under- 
score the importance of the self-serving bias 
as a cause of impasse. There was a strong ten- 
dency toward self-serving judgments of fair- 
ness and predictions of the judge' s award 
when subjects knew their roles. Furthermore, 
the magnitude of the bias was a significant pre- 
dictor of nonsettlement. 
III. Conclusions 
Experimentation is now commonplace in 
economics; however, our focus on the role that 
fairness plays in bargaining led us to depart 
from the types of experiments typically con- 
ducted by economists. In most economics ex- 
periments, great pains are taken to remove any 
context. For example, in most market experi- 
ments, economic variables are given nonevoc- 
ative single-letter labels so as to reduce 
nonpecuniary sources of utility and to prevent 
subjects from mindlessly conforming to estab- 
lished patterns of behavior. Similarly, in pre- 
vious experimental studies of bargaining, 
adjudicators have been simulated by random 
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devices such as the drawing of a numbered 
bingo ball (see e.g., Linda B. Stanley and Don 
L. Coursey, 1990). 
In our study we broke with this tradition and 
presented subjects with a detailed rich natural 
context. We did this because the self-serving 
bias which is our central focus is likely to be 
more prominent and to play a more significant 
role in disputes with multiple arguments on 
both sides. Like most disputes in the real 
world, the existence of multiple arguments, 
pro and con, for each side introduces the pos- 
sibility of self-serving bias by allowing sub- 
jects to focus on, or weight, differentially 
arguments favoring themselves over the other 
party. We believe that self-serving biases are 
likely to be less pronounced in experiments 
using an abstracted dispute and in experiments 
where uncertainty comes only from chance 
devices. 
A key feature in our experiments was that 
all information was shared. Subjects read the 
same materials and knew that they were doing 
so; they also knew that both parties were fol- 
lowing the same procedure in terms of the se- 
quence of the experiment. Under these 
conditions, the fact that their estimates of the 
judge were systematically different points to 
an important insight regarding information- 
processing. Information is usually assumed to 
facilitate settlement because it should cause 
the parties' expectations to converge. As 
Richard Posner (1986 p. 525) writes, 
a full exchange of information . . . is 
likely to facilitate settlement by enabling 
each party to form a more accurate, and 
generally therefore a more convergent, 
estimate of the likely outcome of the case. 
The rules of discovery and information- 
sharing that prevail in the legal system are 
premised on the notion that providing common 
information will lead to a convergence of ex- 
pectations about the adjudicated outcome of a 
case. The assumption of convergence also 
seems to underlie the often-expressed view 
that labor impasses could be avoided if firms 
were willing to "open the books" to the 
union. 
Contrary to this view, our results support the 
notion that common information does not nec- 
essarily lead to a convergence of viewpoints 
and, therefore, does not necessarily promote 
settlement. Thus, the sharing of information in 
disputes, despite increasing the amount of in- 
formation common to both parties, may cause 
expectations or perceptions of fairness to di- 
verge rather than converge. 
Most analyses of bargaining attribute non- 
settlement to strategic behavior. It is gener- 
ally assumed that parties fail to realize 
potential gains to trade due to their strategic 
attempts to maximize their own payoffs. Our 
results suggest a somewhat different, al- 
though not mutually exclusive, account of 
nonsettlement. Perhaps disputants are not try- 
ing to maximize their expected outcome, but 
only trying to achieve a fair outcome. How- 
ever, what each side views as fair tends to be 
biased by self-interest, reducing the prospects 
for settlement. 
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